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I. INTRODUCTION
The national legalization of same-sex marriage by the United States
Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges (“Obergefell”) is just the tip of the
proverbial iceberg of change in family law.1 Over the last fifty years, the
function and definition of “family” has undergone major cultural shifts caused
by no-fault divorce, high divorce rates, increased frequency of childbirth
outside of marriage, cohabitation, blended families, reproductive technology,
genetic testing, delayed marriage, and the Supreme Court’s recognition of the
rights and obligations of unmarried fathers in Stanley v. Illinois and its
progeny.2 These trends have created new family compositions that did not
exist a generation ago.3 Today, more adults than just the child’s biological or
adoptive parents have an integral role in a child’s life.4 Historically, only
natural or adoptive parents were legally recognized as possessing “the
authority to make significant decisions” in the child’s life related to “health
care, education, permission to marry, and to enlist in the military.”5 Thus,
when a non-biological, non-adoptive adult’s relationship ended with the
child’s biological or adoptive parents, then the non-biological, non-adoptive
adult had no legal rights to the child.6 In essence, the non-biological, nonadoptive adult becomes a “legal stranger” with no rights to visitation or
continued involvement in the child’s life.7 This may result in uprooting some
of the most long-lasting, meaningful relationships the child has ever known.
Some states have sought to address this dilemma by recognizing these nonbiological, non-adoptive adults as legal parents.8 This recognition has the
1

See generally 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
See, e.g., 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381–82 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267–68 (1983); David D.
Meyer, Section II: Civil Law, Procedure, and Private International Law: Parenthood in a Time of
Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP.
L. 125, 133–36 (2006).
3
See Meyer, supra note 2, at 133–36.
4
See id. at 126, 132.
5
See PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.03(f) (AM. L. INST. 2002) (defining decision-making responsibility and explaining that most states
define legal custody as the ability to make major life decisions for a child).
6
See Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and
Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J. L. FAM. STUD. 309, 313–17 (2007). For example,
under the Ohio Parentage Act, the “parent and child relationship” is defined as “the legal relationship that
exists between a child and the child’s natural or adoptive parents . . . .” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3111.01(A) (LexisNexis 2015).
7
Jacobs, supra note 6, at 317 (“[W]ithout recognition as a legal parent, a person may be seen in the
law as a third party or ‘legal stranger’ who is not entitled to a relationship with a child with whom the
individual has fostered a parental relationship.”).
8
See Colleen M. Quinn, Mom, Mommy & Daddy, Dad & Mommy: Assisted Reproductive
Technologies & the Evolving Legal Recognition of Tri-Parentings, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
L. 175, 180–185 (2018); Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek
Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 1–2 (2013); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Changing
2
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potential to result in the simultaneous legal recognition of three or more
people as parents. 9
This Article first provides an overview of the case law of the roughly
thirteen states that have expanded the definition of parenthood to allow the
allocation of parental rights to more than two parents simultaneously. Next,
the Article delves into the legal quicksand created by the simultaneous legal
recognition of more than two parents as related to: (1) the children’s best
interests; (2) biological and adoptive parents’ rights; and (3) court resources.
In conclusion, this Article explains the need for a national definition of
parentage.
II. OVERVIEW OF CASES
The designation of additional parents beyond biological and adoptive
parents arises under a variety of monikers, including de facto parent,
psychological parent, in loco parentis, parents by estoppel, and emotional
parent.10 Each term has their own unique definition that a potential parent
must meet in order to be considered as such. First, to be considered a de facto
parent:
The individual must have lived with the child for a significant
period of time (not less than two years), and acted in the role
of a parent for reasons primarily other than financial
compensation. The legal parent or parents must have agreed
to the arrangement, or it must have arisen because of a
complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform
caretaking functions. In addition, the individual must have
functioned as a parent either by (a) having performed the
majority share of caretaking functions for the child, or (b)
having performed a share of caretaking functions that is equal
to or greater than the share assumed by the legal parent with
whom the child primarily lives.11
Second, a psychological parent is “[a] person who provides a child’s
daily care and who, thereby, develops a close bond and personal relationship
with the child . . . to whom the child turns for love, guidance, and security.12
American State and Federal Childcare Laws: Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 9, 25–35 (2017).
9
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 613 (ALTERNATIVE B) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIIF.
STATE LAWS 2017) (stating that recognition of more than two people as parents is allowed if there are
competing parentage claims, and “if the court finds that failure to recognize more than two parents would
be detrimental to the child.”).
10
See L.P. v. L.F., 338 P.3d 908, 915 (Wyo. 2014).
11
PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(c) cmt.
c (AM. L. INST. 2002)
12
McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658 (N.D. 2010) (quoting Hamers v. Guttormson, 610
N.W.2d 758, 760 (N.D 2000)).
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A psychological parent is also “one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis,
through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the
child’s psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child’s physical
needs.”13 Third, the term in loco parentis “refers to a person who has put
himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident
to the parental relation without going through the formalities necessary to
legal adoption and embodies the two ideas of assuming the parental status and
discharging the parental duties.”14 A parent by estoppel is defined as “an
individual who, even though not a legal parent, has acted as a parent under
certain specified circumstances which serve to estop the legal parents from
denying the individual’s status as a parent.”15 This is usually accompanied by
some sort of reliance by the person claiming “parent status.”16 Finally, an
emotional parent is “a person [the child] looks to for comfort, solace, and
security.”17
The potential for more than two legal parents to be simultaneously
recognized typically arises in four types of scenarios: (1) a relationship
between a couple and a third-party for the purpose of creating and raising a
child; (2) an unmarried, biological mother with multiple sexual partners
during the time of conception; (3) a married, biological mother’s extramarital
affair where the marital presumption applies; and (4) step-parents.18 As
outlined below, at least seven jurisdictions have statutes that recognize three
or more parents: Louisiana, California, Delaware, Maine, Vermont,
Washington, D.C., and Washington State.19 Additionally, there are at least
six states where the ability for more than two parents to be recognized has
been developed through the common law: Illinois, New Jersey, New York,
Minnesota, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania.20 Also of import, but beyond
13
PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.18(c) (AM.
L. INST. 2002) (quoting GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 97–101 (1973)).
14
SooHoo v. Johnson (In re SooHoo), 731 N.W.2d 815, 822 (Minn. 2007) (citing London Guar. &
Accident Co. v. Smith, 64 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. 1954)).
15
PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(b) cmt.
a, illus. 2 (AM. L. INST. 2002)
16
Id.
17
LaChapelle v. Mitten (In re L.M.K.O.), 607 N.W.2d 151, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
18
The marital presumption is a legal presumption that the husband is the father of a child born during
a marriage. See generally Paula A. Monopoli, Inheritance Law and the Marital Presumption After
Obergefell, 8 TEX. TECH EST. PLAN COM. PROP. L.J. 437 (2016).
19
See, e.g., Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847, 854 (La. 1989) (interpreting Louisiana’s filiation and child
support statutes to allow paternity and child support action against the biological father of a child born
during the biological mother’s marriage to another man all while not delegitimizing the child); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 7612(c) (West Supp. 2018) (“[i]n an appropriate action, a court may find that more than two
persons with a claim to parentage . . . are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would
be detrimental to the child.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(1) (West Supp. 2018) (establishing
procedures for determining de facto parent status); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1853 (West Supp.
2017) (“a court may determine that a child had more than [two] parents”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 206
(West Supp. 2020) (“a court may determine that a child has more than two parents if the court finds that it
is in the best interests of the child to do so.”); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.01(1)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 2020)
(establishing procedures for determining de facto parent status); see also infra Part II.A.
20
See infra Part II.B.; Quinn, supra note 8, at 187–88.
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the scope of this Article, a handful of states recognize three parent
adoptions.21
A. States with Statutes Recognizing 2+ Parents
1. Louisiana
In the 1970s, Louisiana adopted a dual system of paternity, thus
becoming the first state to recognize three legal parents.22 Louisiana allows
for dual paternity for purposes of child support when a married woman
conceives a child with a man who is not her spouse and the marital
presumption applies.23 The marital presumption in Louisiana, as with most
states, provides that a child born during a marriage is the offspring of the
husband.24 Under Louisiana law, a child can have two fathers—one father
whose status is based on biology and a legal father based on the mother’s
marital status—and a biological mother.25 The law allows for the child to
receive child support from the biological father and not lose his status as a
child of the marriage.26 But Louisiana courts “have been reluctant to award
custodial rights to more than one father at a time [and] have never treated
three parents as having equal physical and legal custodial rights with respect
to a child.”27 Therefore, the biological father has financial responsibilities,
but no attendant rights to visitation and custody.28

21
See, e.g., Where Can a Child Have Three Parents?, BEYOND (STRAIGHT & GAY) MARRIAGE
BLOG (July 14, 2012, 12:51 PM), http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/2012/07/where-canchild-have-three-parents.html#:~:text=More%20recently%2C%20and%20in%20the,a%20legal%20par
ent%20throu gh%20adoption (noting that California, Oregon, Washington, Massachusetts, and Alaska
allow for third-parent adoptions in some situations); Jennifer Peltz, Courts and ‘Tri-Parenting’: A Stateby-State Look, BOSTON (June 18, 2017), https://www.boston.com/news/national-news/2017/06/18/courtsand-tri-parenting-a-state-by-state-look; Haim Abraham, A Family is What You Make It? Legal Recognition
and Regulation of Multiple Parents, 25 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 405, 419 (2017) (stating that
in open adoptions, there is a greater “potential for multiparenting” and that there is also evidence of cases
where there are three adoptive parents).
22
See Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Custody and Visitation in Families with Three (or More)
Parents, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 399, 401 (2018) (citing Warren v. Richard, 296 So.2d 813, 815 (La. 1974)).
23
See LA. CONST. art. 185; State v. Reed, 52 So.3d 145, 146–47 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Smith v.
Cole, 553 So.2d 847 (La. 1989) (highlighting a child support case involving legal father––husband of
mother who had a vasectomy––and biological father––husband’s brother who had affair with mother).
24
Smith, 553 So.2d at 849–50; see also Lopes v. Lopes, 518 P.2d 687, 689 (Utah 1974); Earp v. Earp,
464 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Ark. 1971) (citing Jacobs v. Jacobs, 225 S.W. 22, 23 (Ark. 1920)).
25
See generally Smith, 553 So.2d at 847; T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.2d 873, 881 (La. 1999) (Kimball,
J., dissenting) (describing Article 209 filiation proceedings and ruling in Smith).
26
State ex rel. Wilson v. Wilson, 855 So.2d 913, 914–16 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming trial court’s
calculation of the paternal child support obligation and dividing the payment of the same pro rata between
the biological father and presumed father, and holding that the trial court’s calculation was performed in
“the spirit of the [child support] guidelines”); Smith, 553 So.2d at 854 (“[T]his paternity and support action
will not alter [the child’s] status as the legitimate offspring of her mother’s former husband . . . .”).
27
Cahn & Carbone, supra note 22, at 401.
28
See id.; Wilson, 855 So.2d at 914–16 (“The biological father does not escape his support obligations
merely because others may share with him the responsibility.”) (quoting Smith, 553 So.2d at 854)
(emphasis omitted).
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2. California
Since 2013, in “rare cases” in California, a child may have more than
two parents pursuant to section 7612 of the California Family Code.29 Section
7612(c) states:
In an appropriate action, a court may find that more than two
persons with a claim to parentage under this division are
parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents
would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment
to the child, the court shall consider all relevant factors,
including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the child
from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the
child’s physical needs and the child’s psychological needs for
care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a
substantial period of time. A finding of detriment to the child
does not require a finding of unfitness of any of the parents
or persons with a claim to parentage.30
California courts have explained, that to qualify as a “presumed
parent,” the individual must “treat the child as though the child was his or her
own by developing a parental relationship and taking on ‘parental
responsibilities—emotional, financial, and otherwise.’”31 The person’s
commitment to the child and to parental responsibilities are what ultimately
matter in determining presumed parental status.32 Therefore, caring for a
child out of convenience, rather than commitment to the child (for example
to receive welfare benefits) will not garner an individual presumed parent
status.33 California courts explained, that a third-parent finding, there is state
recognition of a pre-existing relationship between a putative third parent and
child.34 Thus, it should only be granted if there actually was a pre-existing
relationship between the putative third parent and the child and should not be
granted if there is only a potential that the relationship could develop.35
An example of the California three-parent statute in application is
C.A. v. C.P., where the child was born as a result of an extramarital affair the
married mother had with a co-worker.36 The biological father sued to obtain
legal recognition as a parent, and the mother and her husband opposed.37 The

29

S.B. 274, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013)
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West Supp. 2018).
In re Alexander P., 4 Cal. App. 5th 475, 493 (2016) (quoting In re Jovanni B., 221 Cal. App. 4th
1482, 1488 (2013)) (emphasis in original).
32
Id. at 494.
33
Id. at 495 (citing In re Spencer W., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1647, 1654 (1996)).
34
See In re Donovan L., 224 Cal. App. 4th 1075, 1089–90 (2016).
35
Id. at 1089–90.
36
29 Cal. App. 5th 27, 30 (2018).
37
Id. at 31.
30
31
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court granted the biological father third-parent recognition.38 The court
explained:
Defendants could have prevented plaintiff from meeting the
definition of a presumed father by excluding him from the
child’s life from the moment of birth. . . . But they did not
choose that avenue. They instead allowed plaintiff to form a
bond with the child, pay support for her, hold her out as his
own, receive her into his home, and introduce her to his close
relatives, with whom she bonded during the first three years
of her life.39
In short, the biological father, “[f]or over three years . . . treated the
child as his daughter with the consent of defendants.”40 The Court of Appeals
affirmed, reasoning that “[t]he evidence establishes [she] is a child who would
benefit greatly from the continued love, devotion and day to day involvement
of three parents.”41
3. Delaware
In Delaware, a person who is not biologically related to a child can
become a parent to that child through establishing that he or she meets the “de
facto parent” statutory qualifications which requires a court to determine that
the person:
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child’s parent or
parents who fostered the formation and establishment of a
parent-like relationship between the child and the de facto
parent; (2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child
. . .; and (3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time
sufficient to have established a bonded and dependent
relationship with the child that is parental in nature.42
Under Delaware law, “parental responsibilities” are defined as “the
care, support and control of the child in a manner that provides for the child’s
necessary physical needs, including adequate food, clothing and shelter, and
that also provides for the mental and emotional health and development of
such child.”43 However, Delaware does not have a set amount of time that a
child and an adult must have a relationship in order for the adult to qualify as
a de facto parent.44 The de facto parenthood statute in Delaware simply states
38

Id. at 30.
Id. at 44 n.3 (emphasis in original).
40
Id. at 44.
41
Id. at 39.
42
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201(C) (West Supp. 2018).
43
Id. § 1101(10).
44
See J.B. v. R.L., 2016 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 6, at *50 (2016) (holding that a claim for de facto parent
status for a husband whose wife had a child fathered by another man in an extramarital affair during the
39
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that the third-party “[h]as acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient
to have established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is
parental in nature.”45
Delaware courts have used the de facto parent statute to recognize
more than two parents for one child. For example, in J.W.S. v. E.M.S., the
unmarried, biological mother had sexual intercourse with two men during the
time of conception.46 She married one of the men, and for four years did not
tell him that he may not be the biological father of the daughter.47 After she
told him, the other man was informed, and they all took a DNA test.48 The
test determined that the other man was the biological father.49 For the next
two years, mother and husband followed an informal visitation schedule with
the biological father.50 When mother and husband were divorcing, husband
was given interim custody of daughter and biological father intervened in the
court action.51 The court named the non-biological father a de facto parent
based on the length of the relationship between the non-biological father and
child.52 Specifically, the child had been consistently living with her nonbiological father since her birth.53 For six years, the non-biological father had
“undertaken a parental role” over the child.54 Additionally, there was no
dispute that the non-biological father bonded with the child, and the child
referred to him as “Dad.”55 Therefore, the court held that the case was “a
unique situation” where a child was found to have three legal parents:
biological mother; adjudicated biological father; and non-biological father
who helped raise the child as the de facto parent.56 The court explained, “one
of the factors in establishing de facto parent status is that the person has ‘the
support and consent of the child’s parent or parents who fostered the
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the child
and the de facto parent.’”57 The court consolidated the two men’s actions for
custody against the mother into one action because the three individuals all
had standing as legal parents of the child and all “will be affected by a decision
parties’ marriage lacked merit, because his seven months with the child as a newborn was not a sufficient
length of time to develop a bonded and dependent relationship). For example, the court in J.B v. R.L.
explained that “[a]ttempting to make a precise finding of how much time is necessary to form a bonded
and dependent parent-child relationship is a difficult venture, which has not been addressed at length by
Delaware Courts.” Id.
45
tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(3) (emphasis added).
46
No. CS11-01557, 2013 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 27, at *4 (Fam. Ct. Del. Apr. 18, 2013).
47
Id. at *4, *19.
48
Id. at *6.
49
Id.
50
Id. at *9, *20.
51
Id. at *8–9.
52
Id. at *21–23.
53
Id. at *21.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at *22–23.
57
Id. (quoting A.L. v. D.L., No. CK12-01390 2012 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 83, at *5 (Fam. Ct. Del.
Sept. 19, 2012)).
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of the [c]ourt regarding issues related to the custody, placement and
visitation” of the child.58
4. Maine
The Maine de facto parentage statute states the following:
The court shall adjudicate a person to be a de facto parent if
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
person has fully and completely undertaken a permanent,
unequivocal, committed and responsible parental role in the
child’s life. Such a finding requires a determination by the
court that: (A)The person has resided with the child for a
significant period of time; (B) The person has engaged in
consistent caretaking of the child; (C) A bonded and
dependent relationship has been established between the
child and the person, the relationship was fostered or
supported by another parent of the child and the person and
the other parent have understood, acknowledged or accepted
that or behaved as though the person is a parent of the child;
(D) The person has accepted full and permanent
responsibilities as a parent of the child without expectation
of financial compensation; and (E) The continuing
relationship between the person and the child is in the best
interest of the child.59
Under Maine law, the adjudication of a de facto parent does not
disestablish the parentage of any other parent, and it does not relieve any other
parent from an obligation to pay child support.60 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine held that the focus of inquiry to establish whether the alleged de
facto parent has standing is the relationship between the alleged de facto
parent and the child, and not on the relationship between the alleged de facto
parent and the child’s legal parent.61 Finally, Maine’s Parentage Act provides
that “a court may determine that a child has more than [two] parents.”62
However, as of January 2021, there are no published decisions relying on this
statute.

58

Id. at *23–24.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1891(3) (West 2015).
60
Id. § 1891(4)–(5).
61
See Young v. King, 208 A.3d 762, 766–67 (Me. 2019) (holding that denying standing to a thirdparty trying to assume de facto parent status on the basis of the biological mother’s refusal to let the thirdparty adopt the child was an error and remanding to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the de
facto parent test).
62
tit. 19-A, § 1853.
59
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5. Vermont
Under Vermont law, an individual can be found to be a de facto parent
if the person demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that:
(A) the person resided with the child as a regular member of
the child’s household for a significant period of time;
(B) the person engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
(C) the person undertook full and permanent responsibilities
of a parent of the child without expectation of financial
compensation;
(D) the person held out the child as the person’s child;
(E) the person established a bonded and dependent
relationship with the child that is parental in nature;
(F) the person and another parent of the child fostered or
supported the bonded and dependent relationship . . .; and
(G) continuing the relationship between the person and the
child is in the best interests of the child.63
Although a Vermont court may determine “that a child has more than
two parents if the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child to do
so,” as of January 2021, there have been no reported cases analyzing this
statute.64 The best interest of the child in parentage actions are determined
based on:
(1) the age of the child;
(2) the length of time during which each person assumed the
role of parent of the child;
(3) the nature of the relationship between the child and each
person;
(4) the harm to the child if the relationship between the child
and each person is not recognized;
(5) the basis for each person’s claim to parentage of the child;
and
(6) other equitable factors arising from the disruption of the
relationship between the child and each person or the

63
64

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501(a)(1) (West 2017).
Id. § 206(b).
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likelihood of other harm to the child.65
6. Washington, D.C.
In Washington, D.C., the District of Columbia Safe and Stable Homes
for Children and Youth Act of 2007 (“the Act”) establishes a way for a de
facto parent to assume roles traditionally held by a biological parent.66
Specifically, the Act states that:
(1) “De facto parent” means an individual:
(A) Who:
(i) Lived with the child in the same household at the time of
the child’s birth or adoption by the child’s parent;
(ii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the
child’s parent; and
(iii) Has held himself or herself out as the child’s parent with
the agreement of the child’s parent or, if there are 2 parents,
both parents; or
(B) Who:
(i) Has lived with the child in the same household for at least
10 of the 12 months immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint or motion for custody;
(ii) Has formed a strong emotional bond with the child with
the encouragement and intent of the child’s parent that a
parent-child relationship form between the child and the third
party;
(iii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the
child’s parent; and
(iv) Has held himself or herself out as the child’s parent with
the agreement of the child’s parent, or if there are 2 parents,
both parents.67
In W.H. v. D.W., the biological mother was deceased, and the children
lived with their older brother and grandmother.68 The biological father never
married their mother and his involvement in the children’s life was sporadic.69
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the family court’s decision
that granted the children’s adult brother and grandmother joint legal custody
65
66
67
68
69
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Id. § 206(a).
W.H. v. D.W., 78 A.3d 327, 331, 339 (D.C. 2013).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.01(1)(A) (West 2020).
78 A.3d at 331.
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and granted the biological father supervised visitation.70 The court found that
the older brother lived with the children continually since their birth; during
their mother’s illness and subsequent death, he “took on the duties and
obligations for which a natural or biological parent is responsible”; and he
dropped out of the twelfth grade to assume many of these responsibilities.71
The court also held that, while the grandmother was not a de facto parent, the
family court did not err when it awarded her joint legal and physical custody
of the children because of her prolonged and significant involvement in the
children’s lives.72 As for the biological father, the court found that the Act
and the family court’s judgment did not terminate his parental rights and that
he was still the children’s natural, biological father.73 However, despite not
losing his parental rights, the court found that it was in the children’s best
interests to be placed with their brother and grandmother.74
7. Washington State
In Washington, the recognition of a de facto parent has also resulted
in a child having more than two legal parents. In in re Parentage of J.B.R.,
the Washington Court of Appeals found that a former stepfather was a de
facto parent of his ex-girlfriend’s child, even though the child had two
existing legal parents because the stepfather met the four-factor de facto
parent test.75 In Washington, the de facto parentage test is as follows:
(1) the natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the
parent-like relationship, (2) the petitioner and the child lived
together in the same household, (3) the petitioner assumed
obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial
compensation, and (4) the petitioner has been in a parental
role for a length of time sufficient to have established with
the child a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in
nature.76
Applying this test, the court reasoned, in part, that the biological
father’s decision not to have any type of relationship with his child for more
than a decade; the child did not have an alternative person acting as a father
figure; and the mother’s consent to the stepfather’s relationship with the child
aided in the stepfather’s ability to establish a parent-child relationship with
the child. 77 The court explained that when the petitioner has proven consent
to and fostering of a parent-child relationship, then the State is enforcing a
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id. at 342.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally 336 P.3d 648 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 208 (quoting In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 165 (2005)).
Id. at 213.
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de facto parent’s autonomous rights rather than encroaching on an insular
family.78
B. Common Law
1. Illinois
In in re Custody of C.C., the Illinois Court of Appeals expressed the
need for legislative action or guidance from the Illinois Supreme Court “with
respect to whether one child, born to an unwed mother, may simultaneously
have two additional parents who share equal court-ordered parental rights and
obligations with the biological mother . . . .”79 In that case, the trial court
simultaneously granted legal recognition to a man who signed a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity; a biological father; and the unmarried,
biological mother.80
2. New Jersey
In New Jersey, in D.G. v. K.S., three friends decided to conceive and
jointly raise a child together.81 They discussed the role each adult would play
in the child’s life and described it as a “tri-parenting relationship.”82 They
intended the child to have two homes—one with the biological father and his
same-sex spouse and another home with the biological mother.83 At first, the
three friends were very enthusiastic about the arrangement and the
arrangement was publicized in Marie Claire and on the Nate Berkus Show.84
Litigation ensued after the biological mother decided to move out of state with
the child.85 The court granted the biological father’s same-sex spouse the
designation of “psychological parent” but denied his claim for legal parentage
because it found that it did not “have the jurisdiction to create a new
recognition of legal parentage other than that which already exists—genetic
contribution, adoption, or gestational primacy.”86 The court found that the

78

Id. at 208.
In re Custody of C.C., 1 N.E.3d 1238, 1250 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (emphasis in original).
80
Id. at 1240. A recent Ohio Court of Appeals case, with facts similar to In re Custody of C.C.,
reached a different result. See In re P.L., No. 108312, 2019 WL 6002234, at ¶¶ 103, 106 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 14, 2019). In that case, the Ohio Court of Appeals reasoned that there was no legal mechanism for
the biological father to disestablish K.L.—the man who signed a voluntary acknowledgment
of paternity form two days after child’s birth, and then two years later married the mother and had a child
together—as the child’s father and insert himself as the child’s father. See id. at ¶¶ 3, 106–07. The court
further reasoned, “[t]he relief that appellant seeks—a rescission of the acknowledgment of paternity . . .
and a declaration that appellant is the child’s father—is neither contemplated nor authorized [by the
applicable statute].” Id. at ¶ 107.
81
133 A.3d 703, 707 (2015).
82
Id. 707–08.
83
See id. at 708.
84
Id. at 709.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 726.
79
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tri-parenting model used by the parties was not supported by the law.87 But
the court’s orders gave the biological father’s spouse the rights normally
reserved for parents—sharing expenses and time with the child.88
Specifically, the court ordered the three parties (biological father, biological
father’s spouse, and biological mother) to share medical expenses,
educational expenses, and extracurricular expenses for the child.89
Additionally, the court awarded joint legal and joint residential custody of the
child to the three parties; denied the biological mother’s request to remove
and relocate the child to a different state; and established a schedule giving
the three parties equal parenting time.90
3. New York
In New York, there is conflicting case law as to whether three parent
recognition is a legally recognized formation.91 Two cases supporting the
legal recognition of more than two people with the rights traditionally
reserved for parents are: Dawn M. v. Michael M. (“Dawn M.”) and David S.
v. Samantha G. (“David S.”).92 In Dawn M. an infertile heterosexual married
couple and single woman were living together when they decided to conceive
and raise a child together.93 The single woman was the child’s biological
mother, and the married man was the biological father.94 When the resulting
child was less than a year old, the two women and the child moved out of the
marital home.95 In subsequent divorce proceedings for the married couple,
the court granted a “tri-custodial arrangement” between the biological parents
and the biological father’s wife.96 The court held that such an arrangement
was in the child’s best interest because the child understood both women to
be his mother, and the biological father encouraged that bond.97 In David S.,
a woman and a gay married couple decided to conceive and raise a child
together in a tri-parent arrangement.98 The court reasoned that while there
87

Id. at 727.
Id. at 731.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 706, 722.
91
Compare Matter of Tomeka N.H. v. Jesus R., 122 N.Y.S.3d 461 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020), and Matter
of Wlock v. King, 122 N.Y.S.3d 838 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (finding biological mother’s ex-girlfriend did
not have standing under equitable estoppel theory because under the applicable New York law, a child can
have only two parents at a time), and Matter of Shanna O. v. James P., 112 N.Y.S.3d 792 (N.Y. App. Div.
2019) (“Domestic Relations Law § 70 clearly limits a child to two parents, and no more than two, at any
given time.”), with Dawn M. v. Michael M., 74 N.Y.S.3d 898, 902 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (“Pursuant to
Domestic Relations Law § 70, a parent may apply to the court for custody based solely upon what is for
the best interest of the child, and what will promote his welfare and happiness.”), and In Matter of David
S. v. Samantha G., 74 N.Y.S.3d 730, 731 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018) (finding that the biological father’s husband
had standing to seek custody and visitation).
92
Dawn M., 74 N.Y.S.3d at 899; David S., 74 N.Y.S.3d at 731.
93
74 N.Y.S.3d at 900.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 903.
97
Id.
98
74 N.Y.S.3d 730, 731 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018).
88
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was not any relevant precedent for recognizing legal parentage to more than
two people, the biological father’s spouse had standing to seek custody and
visitation because he showed by clear and convincing evidence that he and
the legal parents agreed to conceive and raise a child together.99
Conversely, other New York courts have held that tri-parenting does
not exist under New York Law. For example, in Matter of Tomeka N.H., the
appellate court held that the biological mother’s on-again, off-again girlfriend
did not have standing to seek joint custody and visitation with the child, which
would have resulted in a tri-custodial arrangement with the biological parents
and the biological mother’s former girlfriend.100 The court held that because
the relevant New York law “simply does not contemplate a court-ordered tricustodial arrangement,” parentage was limited to only two parents.101
Similarly, in T.H. v. J.R., the court did not allow the biological
mother’s ex-girlfriend to be recognized as a third parent.102 In this case, the
court found that there was no pre-conception agreement between the parties
to tri-parent and the biological father did not consent to the ex-girlfriend’s
involvement in parenting the child.103 The court explained that this made this
case different from David S. and Dawn M. because both of those cases
involved pre-conception agreements to tri-parent.104 The T.H. v. J.R. court
further distinguished David S. and Dawn M. cases from the case before it
because those cases involved married couples, which meant that a legitimacy
presumption attached to the non-biological parent’s parenthood claims
because the non-biological parent was married to the biological parent.105
4. Minnesota
In LaChapelle v. Mitten (“LaChapelle”), the court granted third-party
parenting rights while asserting it was not creating an impermissible legal
formation.106 Denise Mitten was the birth mother who was artificially
inseminated with Mark LaChapelle’s sperm.107 Denise was in a same-sex
relationship with Valerie Ohanian.108 Mark was also in a same-sex

99

Id. at 734–36.
See generally 122 N.Y.S.3d 461 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
101
Id. at 465; see also Matter of Wlock v. King, 122 N.Y.S.3d 838, 840 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (finding
biological mother’s ex-girlfriend did not have standing under equitable estoppel theory because under
Domestic Relations Law § 70, a child can have only two parents at a time); Matter of Shanna O. v. James
P., 112 N.Y.S.3d 792, 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (“Domestic Relations Law § 70 clearly limits a child to
two parents, and no more than two, at any given time.”).
102
See T.H. v. J.R., 84 N.Y.S.3d 676 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018).
103
Id. at 684.
104
Id. at 683 (internal citations omitted).
105
Id. The presumption of legitimacy presumes that a child born during a marriage is the child of the
marriage.
106
607 N.W.2d 151, 161 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
107
Id. at 157.
108
Id.
100
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relationship.109 The two couples met prior to the child’s birth to discuss the
possibility of conceiving and raising a child.110 After Denise’s relationship
with Valerie ended, Denise wanted to move with the child to Michigan, and
Valerie and Mark were opposed.111 The Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court’s judgment which granted Denise sole physical custody, on the
condition that she move back to Minnesota, and granted Denise and Valerie
joint legal custody, with Mark having the right to participate in important
decisions affecting the child.112 The Court of Appeals also held that an
impermissible “triumvirate” parenting scheme was not created under the
parties’ settlement agreement because Mark agreed to drop his demand for
legal custody, Denise and Valerie would share joint legal custody, and Mark
would have “various rights” to the child which were not rights of a joint legal
custodian.113 The court found that Valerie was the child’s “emotional parent,”
which means a person the child looks to for comfort, solace, and security.114
5. North Dakota
In North Dakota, the trial court in McAllister v. McAllister, granted
decision-making responsibility and primary residential responsibility of the
child to his biological mother, Robin.115 The court granted Mark, the child’s
stepfather, reasonable visitation and access to the child’s information,
including school and medical, despite the fact that the child’s biological father
paid child support and had a parenting time order.116 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Mark was entitled to
visitation on the basis that he was the child’s psychological parent.117 In North
Dakota, “[a] person who provides a child’s daily care and who, thereby,
develops a close bond and personal relationship with the child becomes a
psychological parent to whom the child turns for love, guidance, and
security.”118 The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that the decision in
this case was not intended to affect the biological father’s rights or
responsibilities.119
6. Pennsylvania
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob
(“Jacob”), reversed and remanded the trial court’s child support order because
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 164.
779 N.W.2d 652, 654, 661–62.
Id. at 654–55, 661–62.
Id. at 658–59.
Id. at 658 (quoting Hammers v. Guttormson, 610 N.W.2d 758, 760 (N.D. 2000)).
Id. at 657.
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the trial court failed to re-formulate the calculus of child support to
incorporate two child support obligors instead of the customary one.120 In
Jacob, the trial court ordered Jennifer to pay child support to Jodilynn to help
support children Jodilynn gave birth to during her civil union with Jennifer.121
However, on appeal, the Superior Court was persuaded by Jennifer’s
argument that Carl, the sperm donor, was “essentially a third parent” to the
children and “as such was obligated to contribute” to the children’s financial
support.122 The Superior Court acknowledged that legislative guidance would
be the best solution, but without it, courts must develop fair solutions to care
for the children and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the child
support, this time including the sperm donor into the calculation.123
III. LEGAL QUICKSAND OF 2+ PARENTS
Traditionally, children could have a maximum of two legal parents at
one time.124 This section explores some of the problems that may arise when
a child has more than two legal parents simultaneously.
A. The Child’s Best Interests
The cornerstone of family law jurisprudence is evaluating custody
and visitation decisions under the best interest of the child analysis.125 For
example, in Ohio, best interest factors include the wishes of the parents; the
child’s wishes and concerns as expressed in a child interview; child’s
interactions and interrelationships with other family members; child’s
adjustment to home, school, and community; mental and physical health of
all persons involved; the parent more likely to honor and facilitate parenting
time rights; child support payments; domestic violence; interference with
parenting time; and whether a parent has established or plans to establish a
residence out of state.126
The legal recognition of more than two parents simultaneously who
live in separate households is not in a child’s best interest because it increases
the number of adults entitled to time with the child.127 It further stretches the

120

See 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
Id. at 476.
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Id.
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Id. at 482.
124
See Jacobs, supra note 6, at 309.
125
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (F)(1) (LexisNexis 2011). Additionally, Supreme
Court jurisprudence has also recognized the historical importance and broad authority of the family unit
regarding minor children and decision making. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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See L.P. v. L.F., 338 P.3d 908, 920 (Wyo. 2014) (discussing the practical problems associated with
identifying more than two parents).
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child’s time between multiple households.128 As a result, there will be
potentially three or more houses that the child is shuttled to and from. For
example, the New York Family Court in T.H. v. J.R., examined the effect on
parenting time:
In light of the current 50/50 joint parenting agreement
between the parents, a three-way shared parenting
arrangement would likely be unworkable. A parenting plan
that only impacts [the biological mother’s] parenting time
would substantially reduce [the child’s] time with her mother
and siblings and is unlikely to be in [the child’s] best
interest.129
There are many scheduling challenges under the current two-parent
structure, arising from coordinating the schedules of two parents and a child
with such items like school schedules; extracurricular activities; parents’
work schedules; parties; holidays, birthdays, vacations, school breaks, and
weekends. Adding a third adult or more will only complicate scheduling
further. Moreover, it encroaches on a child’s time to simply be a child and
spend time with other children in social, non-structured activities that are not
adult-centered parenting time or visitation.
Additionally, more than two legal adults may be confusing to the
child’s personal development because the child will have to learn and
navigate between three or more household values, beliefs, and rules. Social
science research has indicated that children of divorce often feel caught
between “two worlds,” and with more than two parents, the children will be
caught in three or four worlds.130
[A] child’s time, loyalty, and emotional energy are finite
resources. If too many parents attempt to manage the child’s
development, the tragedy of the commons occurs—no parent
can effectively accomplish his or her task without being
undercut by someone else. By the same token, if too many
parents are able to veto another parent’s decisions the tragedy
of the anti-commons occurs—the ability of many to veto
prevents any development.131
Children should have the time, space, and opportunity to be simply
children. Even without third parents, parents already have to compete with
128
See, e.g., McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652, 661 (N.D. 2010) (“The best interests of a
[young] child . . . may not be well served by having him stay in three different homes with three different
‘parents’ each week.”).
129
84 N.Y.S.3d 676, 685 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018).
130
Elizabeth A. Pfenson, Note, Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen? The Potential Concerns of Finding
More Parents and Fewer Legal Strangers in California’s Recently-Proposed Multiple-Parents Bill, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2023, 2060 (2013).
131
Id. (citing Margaret F. Brinig, FAMILY, LAW, AND COMMUNITY 119 (2010)).
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the influences children receive from school, peers, and other communities that
they are involved in.132 More than two households result in too many
transitions for children shifting from different rules expectations, and
personalities between different adult authority figures. More than two parents
means a lack of a centralized authority figure for children. Children thrive
when their homelife is stable, predictable, and safe because it prevents child
abuse and neglect; it helps children become more resilient when they
experience adverse challenges in life; and leads to healthy brain
development.133
B. Biological and Adoptive Parents’ Rights
1. Fit Parent Standard
The legal recognition of more than two parents simultaneously
infringes on the original two “fit” parents’ fundamental right “in the care,
custody, and control of their children.”134 A parent is “fit” when he or she
adequately cares for his or her child.135 In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme
Court held that Washington State’s visitation statute, which permitted any
person to seek visitation with a child at any time, was unconstitutional
because it did not give due consideration to the custodial parent’s fundamental
rights.136 Relying on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court reasoned the Constitution “provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests,” including a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.137 The Court
recognized that a parent’s liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of
their children is one of the oldest recognized liberty interests.138 The United
States Supreme Court further reasoned, “[t]here is a presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children.”139 The right to parental
decision making and other fundamental constitutional rights, like the right to
be left alone in one’s own home “converge to give parents almost complete
authority over childrearing conducted within the home.”140 The Supreme
Court held in Michael H. v. Gerald D. (“Michael H.”) that the “integrity [and
132

Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 834, 841 (2007).
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ESSENTIALS FOR CHILDHOOD: CREATING SAFE,
STABLE, NURTURING RELATIONSHIPS AND ENVIRONMENTS FOR ALL CHILDREN 6 (2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/essentials-for-childhood-framework508.pdf;
see
also
HEATHER SANDSTROM & SANDRA HEURTA, THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF INSTABILITY ON CHILD
DEVELOPMENT: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS 5 (2013), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/3
2706/412899-The-Negative-Effects-of-Instability-on-Child-Development-A-Research-Synthesis.PDF.
134
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
135
Id. at 68–69.
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See generally id.
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Id. at 65.
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Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 520 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
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Id.
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Rosenbury, supra note 132, at 862–63.
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privacy] of the family unit should not be impugned,” further protecting the
rights of biological parents.141
If a “fit” parent no longer wants to continue a child’s relationship with
a non-biological, non-adoptive adult, then courts should honor that fit parent’s
wishes and not force the interaction.142 But, many of the states that are
allowing more than two parents do not require an unfitness determination
before going against the fit original parents’ wishes.143 For example,
California’s law states that the courts can find that a child has more than two
parents if the absence of such a finding would be detrimental to the child, and
a finding of an unfit parent is not necessary for there to be a detriment to the
child.144
Similarly, in Washington, a court can determine that a child has more
than two parents if the lack of recognition would be detrimental to the child,
and that finding “does not require a finding of unfitness of any parent or
individual seeking an adjudication of parentage.”145 In Vermont, a court can
determine that it is in the best interest of the child to have more than two
parents.146 Like in Washington, Vermont courts are not required to find a
parent unfit in order to establish more than two person parentage.147
2. A Parent’s Right to Care, Custody, and Control of Children
The recognition of a third parent is a modification of parental rights
because it dilutes or divests the original two parents of their parental rights.148
When the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the legal recognition of more
than two parents in Michael H., the Court applied the marital presumption and
recognized only two parents (biological mother and her husband) and held
that biological father (Michael) who fathered the child as a result of an
adulterous affair with the biological mother did not have any rights to the
child.149 The Court listed the many “substantive rights” that Michael would
have if he was declared the father of the child, including rights to be involved
in child rearing, decision making for the child’s health and educational
benefit, the right to direct the child’s activities, religious upbringing; and the
141

491 U.S. 110, 199 (1989) (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1005 (1987)).
See Pfenson, supra note 130, at 2059; see also Collins v. Collins, No. CA2003-06-007, 2004-Ohio5653 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2004) (applying Troxel in a case where the child was born during Martha’s
marriage to Jerry. During a divorce action in the domestic relations court, genetic testing revealed that
Jerry was not the child’s biological father. Later testing revealed that Christopher Williams was the child’s
father. The court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the juvenile court that denied Jerry visitation with the
child because the biological parents were deemed fit parents and they were opposed to the visitation).
143
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2013); Uniform Parentage Act, S.B. 6037 § 513(3), 65th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, §§ 206 (b) (West 2020).
144
FAM. § 7612(c).
145
S.B. § 513(3) (emphasis added).
146
tit. 15C, §§ 206 (b), 501(b).
147
Id. §206(b).
148
McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652, 666 (N.D. 2010).
149
See generally 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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responsibility to prepare the child for life including teaching the child good
morals and good citizenship.150
Under Ohio law, for example, rights, privileges, duties, and
obligations flow from the parent and child relationship.151 Examples include
educating the child; caring for the child; liability stemming from the child’s
driver’s license; duty to support; liability for their minor child’s willful
damage to property or theft offenses; and liability for the assaults their child
commits.152 When more than two people are simultaneously legally
recognized as parents, then the newly recognized “parents” may have some
or all of the attending rights that come with that designation.153
3. A Parent’s Right to be Free From Abuse
There is scholarship about how domestic violence perpetrators
misuse the court system to manipulate and control their victims.154 For
example, some domestic violence perpetrators seek to continue to remain
involved in the victim’s life by obtaining custody or visitation rights over the
victim’s children to whom they have no biological or adoptive connection
even after the relationship has ended.155 Although many states’ best interest
factors take into account domestic violence, abusive relationships are
sometimes difficult for courts to discern and the process of the court
proceeding itself can be a continuation of abuse.156
Even in the absence of domestic violence, parents who choose to end
relationships with non-parents should be trusted to make the best decision for
themselves and their children in the absence of an unfit determination.157
There are various reasons why a parent may want or need to end a relationship
that do not meet the legal definition of domestic violence. Emotional abuse,
psychological abuse, economic abuse, controlling behaviors, manipulation,
and intimidation can be as equally damaging to an individual as physical
150

Id. at 118–19, 127 (internal citations omitted).
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.01(A) (LexisNexis 2018).
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Educating the child (Id. § 3331.14); caring for the child (Id. § 2151.05) a parent is obligated for the
child’s driver’s license (Id. § 4507.07); duty to support (Id. §§3103.03, 3111.77) parental liability for their
minor child’s willful damage to property or theft offenses (Id. § 3109.09); and parental liability for the
assaults their child commits (Id. § 3109.10).
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See Michael H., 491 U.S., at 118–19. Compare id. with Cahn & Carbone, supra note 22, at 402 and
Melanie B. Jacobs, More Parents, More Money: Reflections on the Financial Implications of Multiple
Parentage, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 217, 232 (2010), and James B. Boskey, The Swamps of Home: A
Reconstruction of the Parent-Child Relationship, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 805, 816 (1995), and Jacobs, supra
note 6, at 326 (arguing that parents who spend more time with a child should have greater rights in child
rearing).
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See, e.g., Emmaline Campbell, How Domestic Violence Batterers Use Custody Proceedings in
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abuse.158 Not all domestic violence laws protect against those types of
destructive, unhealthy behaviors when they are not coupled with physical
violence or the threat of physical violence.159 If a non-parent is designated by
law to be a parent, then they will be legally tethered to the parent who is trying
to move on from the relationship. A parent being involved in more than one
relationship should not justify the law’s involvement in the child’s life absent
a determination that the biological or adoptive parent is unfit.
4. A Parent’s Right to Travel
In the United States, citizens have the constitutional right to relocate
to another state, which is broadly defined as the right to travel.160 When more
than two people are simultaneously legally recognized as parents, a parent
will have yet another “parent” who can legally challenge their ability to
relocate with the child. D.G. v. K.S. and LaChapelle highlight this problem.161
In D.G. v. K.S., two men and a woman decided to have a child, and then triparent the child together.162 When mother unilaterally decided to relocate
with the child out-of-state, the men sued.163 The court denied the biological
mother’s request to remove and relocate the child to a different state; and gave
all three adults equal parenting time.164 Similarly, in LaChapelle Denise
(birth mother) wanted to move with the child from Minnesota to Michigan,
and Valerie (Denise’s former partner) and Mark (biological father) were
opposed.165 The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s judgment that
granted Denise sole physical custody on the condition that she move back to
Minnesota from Michigan.166 Even in those cases where courts allow a
biological parent to move with the child, against the third-parent’s wishes, the
biological parent potentially could face court orders requiring them to return
the child to the home state on a set schedule to visit the other “parents.”
In modern society, it is not uncommon for people to couple and recouple and move to different states multiple times while raising children. As
biological or original parents move from state to state, they leave behind other
“parents” in their wake. For example, a 2015 study found that out of all adults
living with their own children younger than eighteen, 14% had been married
158
See generally NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, https://www.thehotline.org/ (last visited Apr.
25, 2021); Melinda Smith, M.A. & Jeanne Segal, Ph.D., Domestic Violence and Abuse, HELPGUIDE,
https://www.thehotline.org/resources/types-of-abuse/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2021).
159
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3113.31(A) (LexisNexis 2015).
160
The Right to Travel, CORNELL L. SCH., LEGAL INFO. INSTIT., https://www.law.cornell.edu/c
onstitution-conan/amendment-14/section-1/the-right-to-travel (last visited Feb. 10, 2021) (citing Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)).
161
See generally D.G. v. K.S., 133 A.3d 703 (2015); LaChapelle v. Mitten (In re L.M.K.O), 607 N.W.
2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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607 N.W.2d at 157.
166
Id. at 168.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol46/iss2/2

2021]

Legal Quicksand

127

twice; 2.3% had been married three or more times; and 11% had never been
married.167 Additionally, the study found that “2.4 million children lived in a
household that included a parent’s unmarried opposite-sex partner who was
not also the child’s parent.”168 The list of adults who could potentially qualify
as a parent under the expanded definition is limitless.
C. Court Resources
The legal recognition of more than two parents simultaneously has
the potential to put further strain on the already heavy caseloads of family law
courts. When more people are classified as a parent, there will be more
confusion and increased potential for conflict and litigation, which will, in
turn, stretch the already limited court resources. Specifically, when courts
recognize more than two parents, there is a greater chance for disagreements
and misunderstandings over child-rearing.169 For example, in T.H. v. J.R., the
New York Family Court observed:
[A] tri-party joint custody arrangement as requested by Ms.
H would require the three parties to make decisions about A.
together. Based on the testimony presented, the court
concludes that Ms. S., Mr. R. and Ms. H. are extremely
unlikely to be able to jointly make even the most basic
decisions about A.’s education and care.170
More than two-parent recognition has the potential to result in an
increased number of litigants filing a dizzying array of motions for change of
custody; contempt for the interference of parental time; supervised parenting
time; and modification of parenting time. Every parent would be entitled to
notice, service, opportunity to be heard, and the opportunity to object or
appeal the ruling.171 Trials could go on for even longer, as each party is
entitled to call their own witnesses and to cross-examination other parties’
witnesses.
The parent-child relationship affects many other areas of law
including adoptions, wills and trusts, wrongful death, worker’s compensation,
unemployment, social security, insurance, military benefits, immigration, and
taxes. For example, according to the Operations Manual for Maine’s Social
Security Program “an individual who meets the legal requirements to become
a de facto parent in Maine also meets the agency’s definition of ‘parent’ in

167
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the [Supplemental Security Income] program.”172 Therefore, a lack of a
consistent, national definition of parenthood could lead to increased litigation
in related courts.
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A NATIONAL DEFINITION OF
PARENTHOOD
A review of the variety of definitions of “parenthood” across the
states demonstrate a clear and long overdue need for a national understanding
of the terms that describe the people that nurture and support a child. Children
are too important to have ill-defined categories for the most influential people
in their lives.
Expanding the legal definition of parenthood to include the
simultaneous recognition of more than two legal parents is unnecessary
because many states already have a viable solution for adults who are not the
child’s legal parent but have an interest in the child: companionship time. For
example, in Ohio, companionship time is defined as follows:
In a divorce, dissolution of marriage, legal separation,
annulment, or child support proceeding that involves a child,
the court may grant reasonable companionship or visitation
rights to any grandparent, any person related to the child by
consanguinity or affinity, or any other person other than a
parent, if all of the following apply:
(a) The grandparent, relative, or other person files a motion
with the court seeking companionship or visitation rights.
(b) The court determines that the grandparent, relative, or
other person has an interest in the welfare of the child.
(c) The court determines that the granting of the
companionship or visitation rights is in the best interest of the
child.173
Companionship time is a better alternative to a legal finding of
parentage because it allows an important adult in the child’s life to continue
to spend time with the child, while not infringing on the unique, hallmarked
status of parent that has been established by biology or through a timehonored legal process such as adoption (with notice and opportunity to be
heard). Moreover, companionship time hearings give special weight to a fit
172
Program Operations Manual System (POMS), SOC. SEC., https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/
lnx/1600905022 (last visited March 1, 2021).
173
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2015); see generally S.D. v. K.H., 98 N.E.3d
375, 375–79 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that California law allows for a child to have more than two
parents, but Ohio law does not and holding that companionship time was a viable option for a biological
mother’s former girlfriend who was granted parenting rights in California but who could not have the same
enforced in Ohio because parenting rights were reserved for parents).
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parent’s wishes.174
Parenthood should have the same meaning in all fifty states because
people increasingly move from state-to-state. The lack of a national
understanding of the term “parent” is increasingly problematic. The United
States Supreme Court should grant certiorari on a case involving the function
and definition of parenthood.175 Thirty-one years ago, when the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of the simultaneous legal recognition of more than
two legal parents in Michael H., Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and
stated: “California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood.”176 In the intervening years since Michael H., there have been
major shifts in the law both on the state and federal level including California
and other states recognizing multiple parents and the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Obergefell which legalized same sex marriage in all fifty states.177 As
generationally defining as Obergefell was, it was a marriage case and not a
parenthood case.178 Prior to Obergefell, each state decided for itself whether
it would recognize same sex unions.179 Just like Obergefell held that there
would be one definition of marriage in the United States, the Supreme Court
should make a ruling that establishes one definition of parenthood in the
United States.180 There should be bright line, predictable rules as to who is a
parent and who is not.181 The Supreme Court should hear a parenthood case
and make a national definition of parenthood, as it did for marriage. Many
courts that have refrained from simultaneously recognizing more than two
parents have done so because they posit that this responsibility lies with the
legislature.182 A Supreme Court case is a better solution because waiting for
each state’s legislature to modernize its definition of parenthood will result in
state nuances, and it will not provide the necessary national uniformity for
this foundational societal position.
The legal recognition of more than two people as parents is fraught
with potential problems. It dilutes the rights of biological or adoptive parents
even though they have done nothing (such as abuse or neglect) to warrant that
result. In many cases, these biological or adoptive parents have done nothing
174
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precedents.”).
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more than entered and exited a relationship that failed. It is unjust for a nonbiological, non-adoptive person to remain legally tethered to a child when that
person’s relationship with the biological or adoptive parent has ended and
when that person did not take a traditional, time-honored step of adopting the
child. Adoption or companionship time of a child is a better option than thirdparent recognition because those procedures afford procedural safeguards to
the original two parents such as consent, notice, and opportunity to be heard.
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